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Sensors for Detection of Misbehaving Nodes in MANETs
Frank Kargl Andreas Klenk Michael Weber
Stefan Schlott
Department of Multimedia Computing
University of Ulm
Abstract: The fact that security is a critical problem when implementing mobile ad
hoc networks (MANETs) is widely acknowledged. One of the different kinds of mis-
behavior a node may exhibit is selfishness. A selfish node wants to preserve its re-
sources while using the services of others and consuming their resources. One way of
preventing selfishness in a MANET is a detection and exclusion mechanism. In this
paper, we focus on the detection and present different kinds of sensors that will find
selfish nodes. First we present simulations that show the negative effects which self-
ish nodes cause in MANET. In the related work section we will analyze the detection
mechanisms proposed by others. Our new detection mechanisms that we describe in
this paper are called activity-based overhearing, iterative probing, and unambiguous
probing. Simulation-based analysis of these mechanisms show that they are highly
effective and can reliably detect a multitude of selfish behaviors.
1 Selfish nodes in MANETs
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) rely on the cooperation of all participating nodes. The
more nodes cooperate to transfer traffic, the more powerful a MANET gets. But supporting
a MANET is a cost-intensive activity for a mobile node. Detecting routes and forwarding
packets consumes local CPU time, memory, network-bandwidth, and last but not least
energy. Therefore there is a strong motivation for a node to deny packet forwarding to
others while at the same time using their services to deliver own data.
In table 1, we analyze different possibilities for a selfish node to save its own resources
in a MANET based on the DSR routing protocol [JMHJ03, Pe01]. It uses the attack-tree
notation proposed by Bruce Schneier [Sc99] that allows the analysis of different ways how
an attacker can achieve his goal. Alternatives to reach a certain goal are denoted by OR,
multiple steps that are necessary to reach a goal are denoted by AND. Using the numbers
in the table, we can easily describe different attacks. For example, attack 3.1 stands for
”Drop data packets”.
Whereas most of the attacks based on manipulations of routing data can be detected by
the use of a secure routing protocol like Ariadne [HPJ02], SRP [PH02a, PH02b, PH02c,
PHS02, PH03], ARAN [SDL+02], or SAODV [Gu02, GA02], there remain two attacks in
the attack tree that cannot be detected this easily. When nodes simply drop packets (case
1.1 and 3.1 in the attack tree), all of the secure routing protocols fail as they focus only on
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Attack tree: Save own resources
OR 1. Do not participate in routing
OR 1. Do not relay routing data
OR 1. Do not relay route requests
2. Do not relay route replies
3. Set hop limit or TTL value in route request/reply to small-
est possible value
2. Modify routing data/topology
OR 1. Modify route request
OR 1. Insert additional hops
2. Modify route reply
OR 1. Replace own ID in returned route with detour leading
through neighboring nodes
2. Return completely wrong route, provoking RERR and
salvaging
3. Insert additional hops
4. Declare own ID in source route as external
2. Stop participation in current route
AND 1. Provoke route error
OR 1. Create arbitrary RERR messages
2. Do not send ACK messages (causing RERRs in other
nodes)
2. Do not participate in following route request (A.1)
3. Do not relay data packets
OR 1. Drop data packets
2. Set hop limit/TTL to 0/1 (causing a RERR)
Table 1: Attack Tree: Save own resources
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Parameter Value
Number of Nodes 50
Area X (m) 1500
Area Y (m) 300
Transmission Range Radius (m) 250
Traffic Model cbr
Sending rate (packets/s) 4.0
Max. number of connections 20
Packet size (byte) 512
Simulation time (s) 900
Table 2: Simulation parameters
the detection of modifications to routing data but not on the concealment of existing links.
We have done a number of simulations that show how this behavior affects a MANET.
The simulations were done using ns-2.1b8a and the DSR routing protocol. The scenario
included 50 nodes moving in an area of 1500x300m according to the random waypoint
model at speeds of 1ms and 20
m
s with no pause time. Twenty of the nodes were CBR
sources sending 4 packets per second. Details of the simulation parameters are given in
table 2. These parameters are used for all following simulations.
Figure 1 shows the results of these simulations. We have varied the number of selfish nodes
from 0 to 50 (the total number of nodes in the network). It is obvious that the number of
selfish nodes has a significant effect on the rate of packets that are successfully delivered
in the network. Further the movement rate has a clear effect. The faster nodes move, the
lower the delivery ratio becomes. Finally we see that at lower speeds nodes of case 3.1
are more detrimental to the network than those of type case 1.1, whereas at higher speeds
there are no big differences.
What explanations can be found for this? When the number of case-1.1 nodes rises in a
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Figure 1: Selfish attack simulation
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network, there are less nodes available for building up routes. So if no alternative route
can be established, there is no route to the destination which means that packets have to
be discarded. That reduces the delivery rate. When movement speed rises, the delivery
ratio also diminishes as the network in general gets more fragile. But the network still
has a reasonable chance of routing around the selfish nodes. This changes with type case-
3.1. Here the nodes behave correctly during the route discovery phase. Thus they can be
included in regular routes, but then they start to drop all packets. This isn’t detected by
DSR and no countermeasures are taken. So at a movement speed of 20ms only 10% of the
selfish nodes push the probability of a successful packet delivery below 50%.
Our simulations with AODV have revealed a similar behavior. This demonstrates clearly
that an effective protection against selfish and malicious nodes is absolutely mandatory for
ad hoc networks.
2 Motivation vs. Detection & Exclusion
There are two approaches of dealing with selfish nodes. The first approach tries to give
a motivation for participating in the network function. A typical system representing this
approach is Nuglets by Hubeaux et al. [BH01, BH03]. The authors suggest to introduce a
virtual currency called Nuglets that is earned by relaying foreign traffic and spent by send-
ing own traffic. The major drawback of this approach is the demand for trusted hardware
to secure the currency. There are arguments that tamper-resistant devices in general might
be next to impossible to be realized [AK96, AK97]. A similar approach without the need
of tamper-proof hardware has been suggested by Zhong et al. in [ZCY03].
Most of the existing work in this field concentrates on the second approach: detecting and
excluding misbehaving nodes. The first to propose a solution to the problem of selfish
(or as they call it ”misbehaving”) nodes in an ad hoc network were Marti, Giuli, Lai, and
Baker in [MGLB00]. Their system uses a watchdog that monitors the neighboring nodes
to check if they actually relay the data the way they should do. Then a component called
pathrater will try to prevent paths which contain such misbehaving nodes. As they indicate
in their paper, their detection mechanism has a number of severe drawbacks. Relying only
on overhearing transmissions in promiscuous mode may fail due to a number of reasons. In
case of sensor failure, nodes may be falsely accused of misbehavior. The second drawback
is that selfish nodes profit from being recognized as misbehaving. The paths in the network
are then routed around them, but there is no exclusion from service. We will later present
more advanced sensors that will allow a better detection of selfish nodes.
In [ZL00, ZLH03], the authors describe a distributed intrusion detection system (IDS)
for MANETs that consists of the local components ”data collection”, ”detection”and ”re-
sponse”, and of the global components ”cooperative detection”and ”global response”.
Their architecture is very promising and similar to the one we use in our project, but they
neglect the aspect how their local data collection should find out on incidents like dropped
packets, concealed links, etc.
Another system is the ”Collaborative Reputation Mechanism”or CORE [MM, MM02]. It
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is similar to the distributed IDS by Zhang et al. and consists of local observations that
are combined and distributed to calculate a reputation value for each node. Based on this
reputation, nodes are allowed to participate in the network or are excluded. In their work,
the authors specify in detail how the different nodes should cooperate to combine the local
reputation values to a global reputation and how they should react to negative reputations
of nodes. For the actual detection of selfish nodes, they only refer to the work of Marti.
A similar approach is conducted by Buchegger et al. with their system called CONFI-
DANT [BB02a, BB02b]. Again, they only marginally describe their detection mechanism
and rely mostly on promiscuous overhearing.
3 MobIDS
We have developed a Mobile Intrusion Detection System (MobIDS) that has a similar
structure like some of the systems mentioned above. As you can see in figure 2, different
sensors collect data from the network.
MobIDS is embedded in a secure system framework called Security Architecture for Mo-
bile Ad hoc Networks or SAM. SAM also includes mechanisms for
• uniquely identifying nodes within the network. Nodes cannot change their identity
or create additional identities to fool sensors.
• secure routing with a special routing protocol called Secure Dynamic Source Rout-
ing (SDSR). Using SDSR nodes cannot alter routing data, so MobIDS does not need
to detect attacks that are based on forging of valid routing data. Therefore MobIDS
sensors can concentrate on the detection of selfish behavior which in turn cannot be
detected by a routing protocol.
• exchange of symmetric keys used by some of the MobIDS sensors. This key ex-
change is integrated into the SDSR routing protocol, so whenever a valid route is
established between two nodes, the necessary keys are exchanged in an efficient
way.
Due to limited space, we cannot describe the full SAM system here. See [Ka03] for a
detailed and complete description. For the rest of this text, we focus on MobIDS and its
detection sensors. As you can see, data from the secure routing protocol SDSR is can also
taken as input to some sensors.
The sensors generate observations. σsn ∈ [−1; 1] represents the nth observation of sensor
s. Positive values represent a positive behavior whereas a negative value expresses non-
cooperative behavior. All local observations of a node ki and a sensor s regarding another
node kj at time t lead to a sensor rating rtki(kj |s) ∈ [−1; 1]:
rtki(kj |s) =
(∑
∀n
ρ(t, tn) · σsn
)
/ n
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MobIDS
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Figure 2: Overview of MobIDS
where
ρ(t, tn) = 1−
(
t− tn
T
)x
tn is the time when a specific observation σsn was made. The function ρ makes older
observations less important than newer once, observations older than t − T are ignored
and can be discarded. x controls the degradation of older observations.
Finally all sensor ratings rtki(kj |s) are combined into a local rating rtki(kj) ∈ [−1; 1] that
expresses the judgment of node ki regarding node kj at time t:
rtki(kj) =
∑
∀s
ws · rtki(kj |s)
ws is a weighting factor which represents the credibility of different sensors. Very reliable
sensors receive a higher weight than less reliable ones.
The local ratings are then distributed to neighboring nodes by flooding them periodically
in a certain diameter surrounding a node. A node averages all received local ratings (in-
cluding his own) which results in the global rating grtki(kj).
As the initial observations are often based on statistical sensors, no node can prove that his
rating is actually accurate. So when distributing ratings, these are signed by private keys
of each node, but no further attempt is made to prove the credibility of a rating. Instead,
global ratings are only accepted when at least N nodes have contributed to the rating. This
prevents alliances of less than N nodes from excluding other nodes from the network.
Based on the global rating, nodes may be excluded from the current network. MobIDS
defines different thresholds tt, te and tr, where te is the exclusion threshold. If the rating
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of a node ki regarding a node kj sinks below te, ki will invalidate all routes containing
kj and will ignore all packets related to kj . After some time, old negative observations
will expire, so the rating of kj will eventually increase again. As soon as the global rating
exceeds the rehabilitation threshold tr, kj will be serviced again.
There is one problem: As the distribution process takes some time to deliver the local
ratings to all nodes, the global ratings of different nodes regarding kj may differ by a
certain amount ². If rtki(kj) < te < r
t
kl
(kj) then node ki will stop servicing kj whereas
kl will still regard kj as a cooperating node. So when ki stops forwarding packets to kj ,
sensors of kl may detect this and punish ki.
Therefore the system contains a third threshold tt, the so-called tolerance threshold, where
te < tr < tt − ². When rtkl(kj) is below tt, kl will tolerate any node to deny service to kj
without deducing negative ratings from this.
In addition, the security architecture contains a mechanism that allows global exclusion of
nodes from MANETs by invalidating their cryptographic identity. But this is outside the
scope of this paper.
Another question is how the different thresholds should be chosen. Up to now we have
adjusted them manually for each type of simulation by running different simulations and
testing the results. In the final section we will outline future research on how to adjust
them automatically.
It is obvious that without good sensors all the following steps (local and global rating,
exclusion) will fail to deliver good results. So the rest of the paper focuses on this aspect
of MobIDS.
4 Advanced Sensors
4.1 Activity-Based Overhearing
We already mentioned that there are a number of problems when a node wants to determine
whether another node actually relays its packet by listening in promiscuous mode for the
transmission. In promiscuous mode, a wireless network interface consumes more power
than in standard mode. Furthermore, there are a lot of cases where a relay node actually
forwards a packet but the node overhearing the relay node’s activity will fail to realize that.
If e.g. the overhearing node is currently transmitting or receiving data in a IEEE 802.11
network at a lower wirespeed (e.g. 5.5 or 2 Mbps) then it will not be able to capture
transmissions that happen at other speeds. Other problems include collisions, cooperating
selfish nodes, and many more.
In our new activity-based overhearing mechanism a node also tries to overhear forwarding
of data packets by its next hop. But this time it only triggers an alarm when it recently saw
normal traffic from this node but then detects no forwarding activity. Using this mecha-
nism we can improve the detection accuracy significantly. Furthermore, our architecture
introduces a threshold. The monitoring node will only trigger an alarm when it detects a
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Figure 3: Traditional vs. Activity-based Overhearing at 1m/s
certain number of packets being dropped within a certain timeframe.
Figure 3 shows simulation results at a movement speed of 1m/s. It verifies the better
performance of the activity-based overhearing mechanism. The left graph shows the de-
tection rate of MobIDS in the presence of a specific number of selfish nodes that operate
according to case 3.1 in the attack tree (forward routing traffic, but drop subsequent data
traffic). All values are taken as the average of 10 different simulation runs. Lets assume a
network with 2 selfish nodes. Then each of the two nodes is (on average) detected by 1.1
monitoring nodes using traditional overhearing. When we use activity-based overhearing
there are 4.5 nodes detecting each selfish node. When the number of selfish nodes gets
higher (from 5 to 10), the traditional overhearing performs better than activity-based over-
hearing. We can use both approaches when the results of both sensors are combined. This
delivers highly acceptable results.
When the number of selfish nodes become large1, detection rates get really bad. Only one
or two nodes will detect a selfish node during the average simulation run. This is partially
because we assume that selfish nodes do not act as sensors anymore. So in case of 10
selfish nodes you also have to take into consideration that 20% of the sensors are gone.
In order to get good results here, we need to combine the overhearing sensor with other
sensors like the probing sensor described later.
The graph on the right in figure 3 shows the false-positives that the overhearing sensors
produce. Here is significant that these values are always low compared to the correct
positive identifications of selfish nodes. In MobIDS, a node is excluded from the network
only if a number of different nodes agree on it being selfish or malicious. So when only
one node has a false-positive this has no negative effects on the detected node.
Simulations at 20m/s (figure 4) show that the detection rate of the activity-based and
combined overhearing even increases at higher speeds. This is due to the larger number of
routing protocol packets that circulate in the network. This enables the activity detector to
predict more precisely whether another host is still in communication range.
1more than 10 or 20% of all nodes!
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Figure 4: Traditional vs. Activity-based Overhearing at 20m/s
4.2 Iterative Probing
In [AHNRR02] the authors describe a mechanism called probing to detect selfish or mali-
cious nodes in a MANET route from source S to destination D. They use onion encryption
to embed a probe command for a specific node X into normal data packets. When X de-
crypts its onion layer, it will find this command and send back an acknowledge packet to
the source. As soon as an acknowledge is missing, S starts a binary search in the path to
find out, where packets are being dropped. S simply sends probes to the selected nodes
and waits for their replies. Figure 5 shows the binary search after which we call it binary
probing.
This approach has a number of drawbacks. The onion encryption is very expensive, as each
packet has to be encrypted multiple times depending on the path length. Furthermore each
node has to decrypt the packet once and each packet has to be acknowledged explicitly by
the recipient D.
But there is an even more severe problem. There is no reliable detection of the node
dropping packets. When a selfish node gets a probe packet it can choose to forward packets
for a limited time (until the probe is over) and then continue to drop packets. Even worse,
depending on how the probing is realized, it may even be able to selectively drop probe
packets destined for another host. This host will not acknowledge the probe and will be
marked as hostile.
In our mechanism, that we call iterative probing, we use a different approach. Like
in [AHNRR02] we assume that a source S has established a secret key kSXi with each
node Xi (i = 1...n − 1) in its path to a destination Xn. There is a command field C
included in the packet header that may contain a node id Xi which is encrypted by kSXi ,
so C = enckSXi (Xi) (i = 1...n). Otherwise the field contains a random number. Each
intermediate node Xj will now try to decrypt C. If the result is its node ID, it will send an
(encrypted) probe reply packet back to S, otherwise it will process the packet as usual. So
S has to encrypt only a small portion of the packet and it has to do so only once (compared
to the onion-encryption approach) Intermediary nodes will only have to decrypt the small
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Figure 6: Iterative Probing
command field and not the whole packet.
In normal operation (that is while it receives packets from Xn as a reply to the packets it
sent to Xn) there is no need for probing. But when S hasn’t received a packet from Xn
for a certain amount of time t, it will sent a probe packet to Xn. If there is no reply within
a certain timeout, it will sent a probe to Xn−1 and so on until it receives a reply from a
node or reaches X1. This is called iterative probing and shown in figure 6.
Iterative Probing has one advantage over binary probing: a selfish node only knows of an
ongoing probing when it is its turn to answer a probe. So it is not able to blame any nodes
on an arbitrary position later in the path by selectively filtering out or forwarding probe
packets. Instead, there are only two possibilities: it can reply to the probe or it can discard
it. All later probe packets are sent to nodes earlier in the path and cannot be manipulated
any more. But there is still one problem remaining.
LetXj be the first node from which S receives an acknowledge. There are two possibilities
now. Either is Xj+1 the selfish node dropping all packets. In this case Xj+1 is also
dropping probe packets and Xj is working properly. Or Xj is the selfish node dropping
packets. But before dropping a packet, Xj checks if it is a probe addressed to himself. In
order to be harder to detect, Xj will then reply to the probe.
So albeit the iterative probing sensor is harder to fail than the binary probing, it cannot
distinguish which of the two nodes is actually the malicious one. We call this problem the
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probing dilemma. In the next section we will present an approach to prevent this. But first
we give an analysis of the iterative probing.
Figure 9 (left side) shows the simulation results for the iterative probing sensor facing the
standard adversary – a selfish case-3.1 node. Even for 10 selfish nodes we still have an
average of 4.9 nodes detecting each selfish node. The false-positives are negligibly low.
So probing is an efficient way of detecting selfish nodes.
4.3 Unambiguous-Probing
As indicated above, the probing techniques described so far face a serious problem: prob-
ing can not unambiguously detect a selfish node. Even worse, the standard probing de-
scribed in [AHNRR02] allows a malicious node to make another arbitrary node look self-
ish. Our iterative-probing can narrow the potential adversary nodes down to two nodes.
In order to clearly identify one of these nodes as being responsible for the dropped data
packets, we can combine the iterative probing with overhearing. Let Xj and Xj+1 be the
nodes that are suspicious of dropping packets like described above. Now we can verify if
Xj is dropping the packet by asking Xj−1 to check if he can overhear the forwarding of a
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Figure 9: Iterative Probing and exclusion of selfish nodes
following probe packet by node Xj . If this probe fails and Xj−1 can’t hear Xj forwarding
the packet, then it is very likely that Xj is dropping the packets, otherwise Xj+1 is the
node responsible for the packet drop.
4.4 Overall Detection Rate
MobIDS combines all presented sensors in order to make a decision on excluding nodes
from the network. Our simulation results show that the detection of misbehaving nodes
is very accurate and we have practically no false accusations. Figure 9 (right side) shows
the percentage of discovered and excluded selfish nodes at different movement speeds.
In this scenario, three different nodes were needed to detect another node as selfish in
order to exclude it from the network. In the simulations, we used combined-overhearing,
unambiguous-probing and route-request scanning sensors in parallel. The last sensor was
not presented here due to space limitations. It takes information from the routing protocol
and detects nodes that are not forwarding route requests properly. As you can see, up
to about 5 selfish nodes, all were detected and excluded reliably. At around 10 selfish
nodes, detection rate drops below 50%. As we have already discussed in the section on
overhearing sensors, 10 selfish nodes are actually 20% of all nodes. As these nodes do
not work as sensors, i.e. they do not contribute to the MobIDS detection system, it is
obvious that detection results get worse. So MobIDS requires the consensus of a significant
majority of all nodes that they want to cooperate and form an ad hoc network. Given that,
detection of a few selfish nodes is very reliable.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
As we have seen, the construction of sensors to detect selfish or malicious nodes in ad hoc
networks is a complex task. In this paper we have presented a number of different sensors
that can detect different kinds of selfish nodes with a good confidence as shown in our
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simulation results. If multiple sensors are active in parallel and a selfish node is detected
by a number of these sensors, then this is a good indication for excluding the node from
the network.
One remaining problem with our current simulations is that all thresholds need to be set
manually in order to get good detection results. So in the future we will try to find ways
how these values can be set and adjusted automatically during operation. Possible can-
didates might be some kind of an adjustment algorithm or a self-learning system using
neural networks. Furthermore we plan to develop and test additional sensors that will e.g.
use topology information from the routing protocol in order to detect selfish nodes.
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